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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN E. PARK, 
Plaintiff and Appell,ant, 
vs. 
ALTA DITCH AND CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
OF OREM, a public corporation; and 
OREM CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross Appellants 
Case No. 
11,345 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action by plaintiff-appellant to quiet title to 
2/288ths of the waters of Alta Springs and to enjoin 
all defendants-respondents from denying plaintiff-
appellant of the use of that flow and quantity of 
water directly from the Alta Springs. By way of 
counter-claim defendant-respondent Alta Ditch And 
Canal Company sought an adjudication that the 
Water Exchange and Rental Agreements entered 
into among respondents covering the waters of the 
Alta Springs were valid and that plaintiff-appellant 
has been afforded all rights as a stockholder of de-
fendant-respondent Alta Ditch And Canal Company. 
By way of counter-claim defendants-respond-
1 
ents-cross appellants Metropolitan vVater District of 
Orem and Orem City sought an adjudication that 
( 1) plaintiff has no right to convey any 
water by means of Orem City's pipeline or its 
other diversion and conveyance works and fa-
cilities; 
( 2) plaintiff has no right to use or main-
tain the connection to Orem City's pipeline or 
to take any water therefrom; 
(3) plaintiff has no right to divert water 
directly from Alta Springs; and 
( 4) for judgment against plaintiff for the 
sum of $1,834.45 for the reasonable value of 
the water received by plaintiff from Orem 
City's pipeline during the period from Novem-
ber 1, 1962 to October 31, 1967. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court 
( 1) dismissed plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint with prejudice 
and adjudicated that 
(2) plaintiff's only right as against de-
fendant Alta Ditch And Canal Company is as 
the owner of 2 shares of stock of said defendant, 
and plaintiff has been afforded all rights and 
privileges thereunder; 
( 3) the Pipeline and Water Rental Agree-
2 
ments and the Exchange Agreements are valid 
and in full force and effect and are binding on 
plaintiff, and that plaintiff is not entitled to 
divert any water directly from the Alta Springs; 
( 4) plaintiff has no right to use or main-
tain the connection to the Orem City's pipeline 
or to convey water through said pipeline or 
through said defendant's other diversion works 
and facilities; 
( 5) defendant Orem City's counter-claim 
against plaintiff for the reasonable value of 
the water delivered by said defendant through 
its pipeline and used by plaintiff from Novem-
ber 1, 1962 to October 31, 1967 be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-respondents-cross appellants Metro-
politan Water District of Orem and Orem City seek 
to affirm the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law 
and Judgment of the trial court as to paragraphs 
Nos. ( 1 ) , ( 2) , ( 3) and ( 4) above and by way of 
cross appeal to reverse paragraph No. (5) above, 
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Orem 
City and against plaintiff in the sum of $1,834.45 
together with interest thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These respondents shall follow the same nomen-
clature in referring to the parties as set forth in 
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Appellant's Brief, except when these respondents are 
separately referred to Metropolitan Water District 
of Orem will be designated "Orem District" and 
Orem City will be designated by name. 
Orem disagrees with appellant's Statement Of 
Facts because it 
( 1) contains essentially only those facts 
carefully selected to be most favorable to plain-
tiff, who lost below, and thereby violates the 
time-honored rule that the facts on this appeal 
must be construed in the light most favorable 
to defendants, who won below; and 
(2) contains facts which are contrary to 
the express findings of the trial court supported 
by the evidence, without attacking those find-
ings. 
And so Orem makes the following Statement Of 
Facts as found by the trial court and as supported 
by the evidence, being directed primarily to the issues 
between appellant and Orem. 
The Alta Springs emerge from the ledges high 
on the north wall of Provo Canyon, approximately 
3 miles above its mouth, at an elevation of some 640 
feet above the canyon floor ( Exh. 29, Tr. 202). The 
original appropriators of the Alta Springs conveyed 
the waters therefrom by means of a high line canal 
through and around the ledges and thence steeply 
down a mountain side ravine to the Orem Bench 
into a ditch which coursed in a general northwesterly 
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direction along the easterly edge of their lands at 
the base of the foothills ( Exhs. 28, 29, 30). Appel-
lant's property is situated on an intermediate bench 
approximately 150 feet higher in elevation than 
where the Alta Ditch passes below his property (Tr. 
54). 
The early appropriators of the Alta Springs 
organized the old Alta Ditch And Canal Company 
as a corporation under Utah law on May 20, 1893 
for a term of fifty ( 50) years ( Fdg. 2, R. 87; Exh. 
26). The old charter expired on May 20, 1943, at 
which time there were 288 shares of stock issued and 
outstanding, of which Orem City owned 100 1/6th 
shares ( Fdg. 3, R. 88). 
Excluding Orem City, all of the remaining stock-
holders of the old Alta Company, owning 187 5/6ths 
shares, re-incorporated into the new A'lta Company 
and all of them (except Orem City) executed the 
new Articles of Incorporation, including Verena C. 
Crandall, the predecessor in interest of plaintiff 
(Fdg. 4, R. 88; Fdg. 7, R. 89; Exh. 3). Orem City 
refused to join the new Alta Company, which touched 
off disputes over their respective rights in the distri-
bution of water and the litigation encompassed in 
Civil No. 15,460 ensued (Fdg. 5, R. 88; Exh. 3). 
The end result of the litigation awarded Orem City 
100 1/6th / 288ths (34.82%) of the waters of Alta 
Springs in its own right and to take the whole stream 
at the Orem headhouse on turns with all of the other 
shareholders of the new Alta Company (Fdg. 5, R. 
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88, 89; Exh. 3, Order Approving Amendments To 
Decree). 
On November 4, 1945, being approximately one 
year prior to the incorporation of the new Alta Com-
pany, Verena C. Crandall acquired 2 shares of stock 
in the old Alta Company ( Fdg. 7, R. 88). In No-
vember of 1946 Verena C. Crandall subscribed to the 
Articles of Incorporation of the new Alta Company 
and thereby conveyed to the new Alta Company all 
of her right, title and interest in the 2 shares of stock 
and assets of the old Alta Company in exchange for 
2 shares of stock in the new Alta Company ( Fdg. 7, 
R. 88; Exh. 7). On May 5, 194 7 Verena C. Crandall 
transferred her 2 shares of stock in the new Alta 
Company to one Robert Calder, and in 1949 appel-
lant acquired those 2 shares of stock from Calder. 
However, the transfer was not made on the books 
of the new Alta Company until March 7, 1951, when 
Certificate No. 224 for 2 shares was issued to appel-
lant (Fdg. 7, R. 88; Exh. 13, Tr. 91). Appellant's 
predecessors used the water represented by said 2 
shares of stock for irrigation purposes below the 
Alta Ditch (Exh. 28, Tr. 198, 199). 
On February 18, 1947 appellant and his wife 
entered into an agreement with Orem City to pur-
chase 5.03 acres of land comprising a part of appel-
lant's subject property (Exhs. 27, 28, Tr. 219). The 
agreement specifically provided that the conveyance 
of the land was made only on condition that no water 
r1ghts, either in pipeline extensions, culinary water 
6 
use or irrigation water, shall be granted. Beginning 
on August 30, 1948 appellant and the Orem City 
Council engaged in a series of discussions pertaining 
to the furnishing of water to appellant's property 
(Exh. 12 - Minutes of Orem City Council). Those 
Minutes make it abundantly clear that no mutual 
understanding was ever reached between appellant 
and Orem City respecting the furnishing of water 
to appellant from Orem City's 14 inch pipeline. Ap-
pellant readily admits that no written agreement 
was ever executed by the parties respecting the 
furnishing of water to appellant from Orem City's 
14 inch pipeline (Tr. 57), and the trial court so 
found (Fdg. 10, R. 91). 
During the year 1949 Orem City constructed 
a 14 inch diameter pipeline from its headhouse down 
the mountain side some 4,445 feet to one of its equal-
ization and distribution steel tank reservoirs (Tr. 
15, 18), together with other water diversion and con-
veyance works and facilities as an integral and nec-
essary part of its water works system whereby the 
waters to which Orem City is entitled from the Alta 
Springs are diverted and conveyed by Orem City for 
distribution and beneficial use by its inhabitants and 
persons outside of its corporate limits (Fdg. 9, R. 90; 
Exh. 28, 29). Sometime during the fall of 1949 ap-
pellant connected into the bottom of said 14 inch 
pipeline at a point immediately above the steel tank 
reservoir (Fdg. 9, R. 90). L. V. Beckman, then Orem 
City Engineer, designed the connection and super-
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vised the construction, which was made with the 
understanding that appellant would pay for the 
water (Tr. 42). Appellant paid the contractor for 
making the connection (Tr. 12) and shortly there-
after constructed a 4 inch pipeline from the connec-
tion to his premises (Fdg. 9, R. 90). From 1949 to 
1958 the Alta Springs water was divided between 
Orem City and Alta on a turns basis (Tr. 34). 
Vvhenever it was Orem City's turn appellant used 
some water through the connection, the quantity of 
which is unknown, for the watering of some lawn, 
a few trees and some horses (Tr. 34, 35, 141). From 
1949 to 1957 appellant leased the water represented 
by 1 3/4ths shares of his 2 shares of stock to How-
ard Ferguson and Richard Anderson, both of whom 
were stockholders of Alta (Tr. 143). The leased 
water was used by them from the Alta Ditch on 
turns (Tr. 143, 144). 
On March 19, 1956 Orem and Alta entered into 
a "Pipeline And Water Rental Agreement" (Exh. 4) 
which essentially accomplished two things: 
( 1) It provided for the joint construction 
of a pipeline approximately 18,400 feet long 
from the Orem headhouse to the Alta Springs, 
with Orem to pay 34.82 % and Alta to pay 
65.18% of the cost and expense thereof; and 
(2) Orem was granted the right to use 
all of Alta's share (65.18%) of the winter water 
October 15 to May 1 of each year for twenty 
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years, for which Orem agreed to pay Alta the 
sum of $5,000.00 per year. 
As to both ( 1) and ( 2) above, appellant signed 
a Waiver Of Notice of the meeting of the stock-
holders of Alta to consider and act on such agree-
ment ( Exh. 17) and the trial court found that appel-
lant is legally bound thereby (Fdg. 11, R. 91, 92). 
As to ( 1) above, Alta's contribution was based 
upon its total of 187 5/6ths shares of stock outstand-
ing, which in~ludes the 2 shares of stock owned by 
appellant. Appellant did not separately contribute 
to the payment of such expenditures save and except 
as a stockholder of Alta owning 2 shares of stock. 
As to ( 2) above, Orem contracted for the total 
of Alta's share of the winter water of the Alta 
Springs based upon its total of 187 5/6ths shares of 
outstanding stock, and again this includes the 2 
shares of stock owned by appellant. Thus Orem 
rented from Alta all of the winter waters of Alta 
Springs which otherwise would be distributed to 
Alta shareholders, including appellant with his 2 
shares of stock. 
On May 16, 1958 Orem and Alta entered into 
a "Water Exchange Agreement" (Exh. 5) which 
essentially accomplished two things: 
(1) The Orem District agreed to deliver 
to Alta up to 1350 acre feet of water on call dur-
ing the irrigation season into the Alta Ditch, 
and to pay Alta an additional $5,000.00 per 
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year. If Alta took less than 1350 acre feet per 
year the Orem District agreed to pay Alta $5.00 
per acre foot for each acre foot less than 1350 
acre feet taken. The agreement was for ten 
years. 
( 2) Alta granted to Orem all of Alta's 
share of the waters of Alta Springs during the 
irrigation season (being approximately May 1 
to October 15) based upon the total of 187 
5/6ths shares of Alta stock outstanding, which 
again includes the 2 shares of stock owned by 
appellant. 
The foregoing Agreement expired by its own 
terms on November 1, 1965. On June 28, 1966 Orem 
and Alta entered into a new Agreement, renewing 
the prior summer Water Exchange Agreement for 
an additional ten years, with some modifications 
(Exh. 6). This Agreement granted Orem the right 
to use all of Alta's share of the Alta Springs during 
the irrigation season based upon Alta's 187 5/6ths 
shares of outstanding stock, which included the 2 
shares of stock owned by appellant. Orem agreed 
to deliver to Alta Deer Creek water on call, or its 
equivalent, in exchange therefor and to pay Alta 
$5,000.00 annually. Thus Orem acquired by ex-
change all of Alta's share of the waters of Alta 
Springs during the irrigation season which other-
wise would be distributed to its stockholders, includ-
ing appellant under his 2 shares of stock. The trial 
court found that said Agreement was duly author-
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ized and executed by the parties thereto and is valid 
and is in full force and effect and is binding upon 
plaintiff (Fdg. 12, R. 92). 
In 1958 appellant replaced said 4 inch steel pipe-
line with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the 
same with a meter at a point where said 6 inch pipe-
line enters his property. Appellant did not consult 
with representatives of either Alta or Orem concern-
ing such change (Fdg. 9, R. 91). 
The Minutes of the Orem City Council meetings 
reflect no minute entries pertaining to appellant's 
connection from October 12, 1949 until October 3, 
1960. With the consummation of the Water Ex-
change Agreement between Orem and Alta in 1958 
the whole of the Alta Springs was placed in the Orem 
City water system continuously during the entire 
year (Tr. 35). At about the same time appellant 
moved his residence to the property in question. 
Thereafter his uses increased (Tr. 144). Since Orem 
had contracted with Alta for all of its share of the 
Alta Springs, inquiries by the Orem City Council 
were made as to the basis of appellant's connection 
as reflected by the Minutes of October 3, 1960, Oc-
tober 17, 1960 and November 7, 1960. On May 8, 
1961 appellant met with the Orem City Council to 
discuss his water connection and represented to the 
Council that he had an agreement with Orem City 
to allow the City to use the 2 shares of Alta water in 
exchange for the equivalent in culinary water from 
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the 14 inch pipeline (Exh. 12), which was not the 
fact (Tr. 57, Fdg. 10, R. 91). 
Having determined that no agreement respect-
ing appellant's connection existed, on July 17, 1961 
the Orem City Council decided that a contract should 
be drawn up and City Attorney Wentz was in-
structed to draw one up - which he did, and which 
was sent to appellant (Exh. 23). A draft of the 
p1·oposed agreement was offered in evidence by ap-
pellant and was received ( Exh. 27). However, appel-
lant emphatically denied that he ever received the 
proposed agreement (Tr. 184). Yet H. V. Wentz 
testified that appellant subsequently appeared at a 
Council meeting and brought the proposed agreement 
with him, but appellant refused to sign it (Tr. 183, 
184). This is borne out by the Minutes of the meet-
ing of October 16, 1961 (Exh. 12). At that meeting 
appellant threatened that if the City did not agree 
to his terms he would run his own line up to the 
head of Alta, put in a tank, etc. ( Exh. 12). 
This controversy continued until 1966 when the 
Orem City Council brought the matter to a head by 
notifying appellant that if the matter was not re-
solved by August 1, 1966 his connection would be 
shut off (Exh. 12 - Minutes of August 1, 1966 and 
August 8, 1966). The end result was that appellant 
then commenced this action. Orem City permitted 
the connection to remain pendente lite and filed its 
Counterclaim for the reasonable value of water used 
by appellant during the preceding four year period 
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<1ncl for all water used by him during the pendency 
of this action ( R. 30, 31) . 
During the early part of the irrigation season 
of 1966 when no Water Exchange Agreement was in 
effect, Orem and Alta went back to the turns basis of 
dividing the waters of Alta Springs (Tr. 268). On 
two separate occasions during that period appellant 
was out of water in his pipeline. To accommodate 
appellant the Orem City water master arranged with 
the Alta water master to turn some water into the 
Orem 14 inch pipeline such that it would flow down 
and into appellant's pipeline so he could get a drink 
(Tr. 269, 295). 
Orem City is also the owner of 41 shares of stock 
of the new Alta Company and the water represented 
thereby is used from the Alta Ditch for irrigation 
purposes on a turns basis, the same as other share-
holders of Alta (Tr. 287, 288). 
Appellant's meter was read periodically by the 
Orem City water master beginning in 1960, with one 
reading in 1960, six in 1961, one in 1962, three in 
1963, none in 1964 and two in 1965. Beginning on 
August 2, 1966 appellant's meter was read monthly 
(Exh. 38). In 1963 appellant's meter became inop-
erative because gravel in the pipeline became lodged 
in the meter, thereby preventing the impeller from 
turning (Exh. 12 - November 4, 1963, Tr. 213). 
Water continued to flow through the pipeline but 
was not measured by the stopped meter. The meter 
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reading showed that during the period from October 
5, 1962 to August 1, 1966 a total of 9,189,200 gallons 
of water was metered through appellant's meter, 
which was less than the actual quantity used because 
of the inoperative period of the meter (Tr. 213). 
During the period from August 1, 1966 to October 
31, 1967 a total of 5,307,000 gallons of water was 
measured through appellant's meter, which is an 
accurate measurement of the quantity of water actu-
ally used by appellant during that period (Exh. 38, 
Tr. 259). 
The water rates for all water sold and delivered 
by Orem City, both within its corporate boundaries 
and outside thereof, are fixed by ordinance. Ordi-
nance No. 45 ( Exh. 35) was in effect from August 
28, 1962 to August 5, 1963 when Ordinance No. 52 
( Exh. 36) was adopted and remained in effect until 
1\1.ay 9, 1966 when Ordinance No. 104 (Exh. 37) 
was adopted and has remained in effect since. All 
three ordinances recite that the rates fixed therein 
are determined to be the reasonable value of the 
water delivered and sold. 
The witness James Twitchell applied the appli-
cable rates as fixed by the above ordinances to the 
quantities of water metered through appellant's 
meter ( Exh. 38) and testified that the reasonable 




October 5, 1962 to 
August 1, 1966 
August 1, 1966 to 
October 31, 1967 
9,189,200 gallons $1,249.85 
5,307,000 gallons 614.60 
Total $1,864.45 
The testimony of the witness Twitchell stands uncon-
tradicted in the record. Appellant did not attempt 
to qualify the testimony of the witness Twitchell (Tr. 
27 4) and offered no evidence contrary thereto. Yet 
the trial court found in favor of appellant and 
against Orem City on this issue ( Fdg. 17, R. 93) and 
dismissed Orem's counterclaim therefor with preju-
dice ( R. 97) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A P PE LL ANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE 
AGREEMENT WITH OREM FOR THE USE 
OF ITS PIPELINE AND FACILITIES TO CON-
VEY ANY WATER. 
Under Point 5 of appellant's Brief he asserts 
that he has a valid and enforceable agreement with 
Orem for the use of its pipeline and facilities for the 
carriage of what he contends to be his Alta Spring 
water. Yet during the trial appellant's counsel ad-
vised the trial court that appellant was not seeking 
a determination on whether appellant had an en-
forceable right to maintain his connection to the 
Orem City 14 inch pipeline or to utilize the pipeline 
to convey any water (Tr. 22, 23). Likewise, appel-
lant's counsel advised the trial court that appellant 
was not claiming an interest in or ownership of any 
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pipeline belonging to Orem City (Tr. 58). 
Those issues were squarely raised in Orern's 
Amended Counterclaim ( R. 67), wherein it sought 
an adjudication that 
( 1) plaintiff (appellant) has no right to 
use or maintain the connection to Orem City's 
14 inch pipeline or to take any water therefrom; 
and 
(2) plaintiff has no right to convey any 
water by means of Orem City's 14 inch pipeline 
or its other diversion works and conveyance fa-
cilities. 
On these issues the trial court found that 
( 1) appellant's connection to the Orem 
City 14 inch pipeline and his use of water there-
from was permissive only, and that permissive 
connection and permissive use of water have 
been terminated (Fdg. 9, R. 91); and 
(2) no agreement, either in writing or 
otherwise, has been entered into between plain-
tiff (appellant) and defendants (Orem) or any 
of them, granting to plaintiff any right to use 
defendant Orem City's 14 inch pipeline or its 
other diversion works or facilities to convey any 
water from the Alta Springs to plaintiff's prop-
erty (Fdg. 10, R. 91). 
And based on those findings the trial court con-
cluded that plaintiff has no right to use or maintain 
a connection to Orem City's 14 inch pipeline or to 
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convey water through said pipeline or defendant 
Orem City's other diversion works and conveyance 
facilities (Concl. 9, R. 94, 95). 
Appellant does not directly challenge the fore-
going findings, nor does he urge that they are unsup-
ported by the evidence. He simply ignores them and 
merely talks about an "arrangement" which he con-
cludes followed from the conduct of the parties. 
We submit that such findings are clearly sup-
ported by the evidence. In fact there is no evidence 
to the contrary. Even appellant's evidence supports 
them. Thus appellant's own Exhibit 12, containing 
excerpts from the Minutes of the Orem City Council 
Meetings touching on this subject, clearly shows that 
no mutual understanding was ever reached between 
appellant and Orem City respecting the connection 
or the delivery of water through appellant's connec-
tion. We so note from the early Minutes of August 
30, 1948 that "the Council made no decision on the 
matter;" and on September 20, 1948 that "it was 
understood that Mr. Park would not have to pay for 
the water used this year, but thereafter;" and on 
October 12, 1949 that "Dean E. Park was present 
to ask the Council to consider him tapping the 14 
inch line .... He was told that it was felt that the 
project could be worked out ... and that it would 
probably be agreeable with the Council." 
Shortly thereafter appellant's connection to the 
14 inch Orem City pipeline was made for him by the 
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contractor who was then installing the 14 inch pipe-
line for Orem City (Tr. 30). Appellant paid the 
contractor for the connection (Tr. 12). Appellant's 
own witness, L. V. Beckman, then Orem City Engi-
neer, who designed the connection and supervised the 
construction testified that the connection was made 
with the understanding that appellant would pay for 
the water (Tr. 42). 
From 1949 until 1958 appellant's use of the 
water through his connection was limited to the 
watering of some lawn, a few trees and some horses 
(Tr. 141). In 1958 appellant moved his residence 
onto the property and his uses increased to supply-
ing his residence and the irrigation of approximately 
10 acres of pasture land in addition to his lawns, 
shrubs and the like (Tr. 144, 145). At about the 
same time appellant replaced his 4 inch steel pipe-
line with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the 
same with a meter at a point where his 6 inch pipe-
line enters his property, without consulting with any 
of the defendants (Fdg. 9, R. 91). 
With the consummation of the Water Exchange 
Agreement between Orem and Alta in 1958 the whole 
of Alta Springs was placed in the Orem City water 
system continuously during the entire year. Since 
Orem had contracted with Alta for all of its share 
of Alta Springs water, including the water repre-
sented by the 2 shares of stock owned by appellant, 
inquiries were thereafter made by the Orem City 
Council as to the basis of appellant's connection to 
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the Orem City 14 inch pipeline. Thereafter appel-
lant repeatedly represented to the various City Coun-
cils that he had an agreement with Orem City to 
maintain the connection and use the water (Exh. 12 
- Minutes of October 3, 1960; October 17, 1960; 
and May 8, 1961). Yet appellant, himself, testified 
that the agreement he claims is represented only by 
the Minutes of the Orem City Council and that noth-
1.ng was signed by him or Orem City (Tr. 57). 
In July, 1961, after it was determined that no 
agreement existed, the Orem City Council directed 
City Attorney Wentz to draw up an agreement for 
the Council's consideration and for the comment of 
appellant (Exh. 12 - July 17, 1961). This Attor-
ney \Ventz did ( Exh. 12 - August 28, 1961) and a 
draft of the proposed agreement ( Exh. 27) was sent 
to appellant with a cover letter dated September 22, 
1961 ( Exh. 23), but appellant refused to sign it 
(Exh. 12-0ctober 16, 1961, Tr. 179, 182, 183, 184). 
In spite of the above appellant contends that 
he has a valid and enforceable agreement with Orem 
for the use of its pipeline and facilities and for the 
carriage of what he contends to be his Alta Spring 
water. Yet appellant cites no facts in evidence from 
which it could be concluded that such an agreement 
had ever been made. He merely talks about an "ar-
rangement" as set forth in his proposal at the Coun-
cH meeting held on October 12, 1949, which he quotes 
verbatim on page 29 of his Brief, and says that he 
and Orem City operated under that arrangement 
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for some seventeen years. If that were so, we ask 
appellant why did he lease 1 3/4ths shares of his 2 
shares to other stockholders of Alta during the 
entire period from 1949 until 1957? Why then did 
he not install his meter until 1958? and if the so-
called "arrangement" was for him to obtain water for 
i1 rigation purposes, which is all the Minute talks 
about, what is the basis of his claim for culinary 
water? 
The fact is that appellant was permitted to hook 
onto the Orem City 14 inch line with the understand-
ing that appellant would pay for the water. Yet 
appellant has never paid Orem City one cent for all 
of the water he received from Orem City's 14 inch 
pipeline (Tr. 143). Appellant was sent a minimum 
bBl in July, 1961 (Tr. 234) but appellant denies he 
received it (Tr. 137). Yet Orem City received a 
letter from appellant's attorney relative to the bill 
(Exh.12 -August 28, 1961). And the reason why 
continued billings were not made is not because "both 
parties were operating under the arrangement re-
flected in the Minutes," as suggested on page 30 of 
Appellant's Brief, but was because the City Manager 
instructed the billing department "to quit billing 
Dean Park, because the City was negotiating and 
settling this with Dean Park" (Tr. 242). However, 
the matter was not settled and was finally brought 
to a head in 1966 when the Orem City Council noti-
fied appellant that if the matter was not resolved by 
August 1, 1966 his connection would be shut off 
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(Exh. 12-August1, 1966; August 8, 1966). The 
end result was that appellant commenced this action. 
Upon the evidence as a whole the trial court 
found the facts against appellant as to any claimed 
agreement. And those findings, being amply sup-
ported by substantial evidence, should not be dis-
turbed and must be affirmed on appeal under the 
well known appellate rules Weight v. Miller, 16 Utah 
(2d) 112, 396 Pac. (2d) 626 (1964); Thorley v. 
Kolob FiBh & Game Club, 13 Utah (2d) 294, 373 
Pac. (2d) 574 (1962); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 
(2d) 193, 64 Pac. (2d) 418 (1961). 
In addition to the above there are at least two 
other reasons why appellant's argument must fall. 
First, the alleged agreemen't which appellant contends 
for must, to be enforceable, be in writing under the 
Statute of Frauds which was pleaded (R. 64). Spe-
cifically the alleged agreement claims either 
( 1) a water right or 
(2) a contract for the perpetual delivery 
of water and/ or 
(3) an agreement which by its terms can-
not be performed within one year from the 
alleged making thereof. 
As to ( 1) and ( 2) above, a water right is con-
sidered to be an interest in real property. In re 
Bmr River Drainage Area, 2 Utah (2d) 208, 271 
Pac. (2d) 846 (1954). And so under (1) above, 
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to be enforceable, the alleged agreement must be in 
writing under the provisions of Section 25-5-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as claiming an interest in real 
property. Or if it properly comes under (2) above, 
it is for the leasing for a longer period than one year 
of an interest in real property and is governed by 
Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. And in 
any event the alleged agreement could not under 
appellant's claimed terms be performed within one 
year from its alleged making back in 1949. Section 
25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Appellant concedes through his own testimony 
that no written agreement was ever executed. As he 
puts it, the agreement he claims is represented only 
by the Minutes of the Orem City Council and nothing 
was signed by him (Tr. 57). Nor will the principles 
of part performance under Section 25-5-8, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 help appellant since what he did was 
contrary to his own proposal, like leasing all but a 
fraction of his 2 shares to third persons. His best 
performance was to take all of the water he wanted 
from Orem City's 14 inch pipeline without paying 
one red cent therefor. 
The second reason why the alleged agreement 
must fail is because it would be in violation of Article 
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, which in part 
provides that 
"No municipal corporation, shall directly 
or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any 
waterworks, vrnte1· rights, or sources of water 
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supply novv, or hereafter to be owned or con-
trolled by it; ... " 
And so appellant's claimed agreement would re-
sult in a perpetual enforceable easement through 
Orem City's 14 inch pipeline and diversion facilities 
which would divest Orem City of an interest in that 
part of its waterworks system. This would clearly 
be in violation of the constitutional prohibition. Thus 
in the case of Genola Town v. Santaquin City, et al, 
96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. (2d) 930 (1938), rehearing 
denied 96 Utah 104, 85 Pac. ( 2d) 790 ( 1938), this 
Court held that an agreement by a municipal cor-
poration to deliver a specified quantity of water in 
perpetuity is a parting of a water right and is void 
under Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah C<YYUJtitution 
unless there is an exchange of water rights of equal 
use value, which this Court found there to exist. It 
was there pointed out that the foregoing constitu-
tional provision should be narrowly or strictly con-
strued since it was meant to secure to communities 
their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease 
to pri,·ate parties. Likewise in Hyde Park Town v. 
Chambers, 99 Utah 118, 104 Pac. (2d) 220 (1939) 
this Court held that a contract whereby the Town 
acquired a right of way for its pipeline over private 
property in exchange for granting the landowner a 
right to tap the pipeline for his own use was void 
as being in violation of Article XI, Section 6 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Although appellant's counsel advised the trial 
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court that appellant does not claim any interest in 
or ownership of any pipeline belonging to Orem City 
(Tr. 58), the effect of his claimed agreement is just 
that, and as such would be clearly void. Apparently 
what appellant suggests, without saying it, is that 
Or-em City ought to be estopped from denying appel-
lant the right to continue such connection. The trial 
court specifically found against appellant on his 
claim of estoppel ( Fdg. 15, R. 93) and concluded 
that estoppel did not run as against Orem or Alta 
(Concl. 5, R. 94). Nor does appellant anywhere in 
his Brief assert a claim of estoppel as against Orem. 
And in any event the law is against appellant on 
that score. Thus, in the Genola Town case, supra, 
this Court stated on page 937 of the Pacific Reporter 
"While in some cases a party may be 
estopped from taking advantage of the uncon-
stitutionality of an act (Tite v. State Tax 
Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 Pac. (2d) 734), 
the representatives of a municipality must act 
within their powers and the city cannot be 
estopped from declaring its own acts unconsti-
tutional." 
We respectfully submit that both under the law 
and the facts of this case there is no basis for appel-
lant's claim that he has an enforceable agreement 
with Orem City for the use of its pipeline and facil-
ities for the carriage of any water, and the Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment of the trial court in that 
respect must be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO DIVERT 
WATER DIRECTLY FROM THE ALTA 
SPRINGS BY REASON OF HIS OWNERSHIP 
OF 2 SHARES OF STOCK IN THE ALTA COM-
PANY, OR OTHERWISE. 
Although this issue is one primarily between 
appellant and Alta, it does involve Orem since with 
the consummation of the Pipeline And Water Rental 
Agreement in 1956 and the Water Exchange Agree-
ments in 1958 and 1966 Orem has contracted with 
Alta for all of Alta's share of the waters of Alta 
Springs based upon its 187 5/6ths shares of stock, 
which includes the 2 shares of stock owned by appel-
lant. And so this issue is important to Orem since 
if appellant were to prevail Orem did not receive 
what it had contracted for with Alta. 
Appellant contends on page 12 of his Brief that 
he has two bases for his claim to ownership of a 
pro-rata share of the waters of Alta Springs, i.e. 
( 1) as a successor to a stockholder of the 
old Alta Company; or 
( 2) as the owner of 2 shares of stock in 
the new Alta Company. 
The trial court found squarely against appel-
lant as to (1) above, to-wit: 
"13. The rights of plaintiff (appellant) 
to the use of water herein are represented by 
and are limited to his rights as the owner of 
2 shares of stock of defendant Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company .... " 
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Such finding is clearly supported by the evidence. 
Thus appellant as the successor in interest to Verena 
C. Crandall acquired only such rights as she had. 
Verena C. Crandall was one of the new incorporators 
of the new Alta Company and subscribed to the Ar-
ticles of Incorporation as the owner of 2 shares of 
stock ( Exh. 7). In so doing she conveyed and trans-
ferred to the new Alta Company all of her right, 
title and interest in and to the Alta Springs and 
other property there involved ( Exh. 7, Ar. XIV; 
Exh. 3, para. 14 of Fdgs. of Fact). Not only is such 
finding in this case supported by substantial evi-
dence but it could not be otherwise. 
As to (2) above, the trial court further found 
" ... Said rights of plaintiff (appellant) 
to the use of water as a stockholder of defend-
ant Alta Ditch & Canal Company are in all 
respects upon the same basis as other stock-
holders and are subject to the same terms, con-
ditions and agreements .... " (Fdg. 13, R. 92) 
Apparently appellant concedes that he is a stock-
holder in the new Alta Company since he argues at 
length that by virtue of his stock ownership he is 
the owner of an aliquot share of the waters of Alta 
Springs. This he says comes about because the Alta 
Company is a mutual irrigation company and as 
such is only a corporate water master. He then cites 
case after case which talk about mutual irrigation 
companies, without comparing the charters of the 
particular company with that of Alta. In so doing 
he completely ignores the fact that when his prede-
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cessor in interest, Verena C. Crandall, subscribed to 
the Articles of Incorporation of the new Alta Com-
pany she, as all other subscribers, conveyed and 
transferred all of her right, title and interest in and 
to the waters of Alta Springs to the new Alta Com-
pany. This she acknowledged under Article XIV of 
the Articles of Incorporation, and the court in Civil 
No. 15460 expressly so found and appellant is bound 
thereby, i.e. 
"14 .... all of the individual users having 
or claiming any stock in said old corporation 
or any rights in the Alta Ditch or Springs, 
except plaintiff (Orem City), at the time of 
signing said Articles of Incorporation, con-
veyed and transferred to said new corporation 
their right, title and interest in and to said 
Alta water, springs and other property here 
involved." (Emphasis added) 
But even so, none of the cases cited by appellant 
in his Brief hold that a shareholder in a so-called 
mutual irrigation company is entitled to his pro-rata 
or aliquot share of the waters from a specific source. 
And in our research we have been unable to find 
any case which so holds. Rather, those cases say 
that shareholders of the so-called mutual irrigation 
company are entitled to their pro-rata or aliquot 
share of the waters distributed by the company, 
whatever be their source, whether exchange waters 
or otherwise. 
Thus in Genol,a Town v. Santaquin City, et al, 
96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. ( 2d) 930 ( 1938) , rehearing 
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denied 96 Utah 104, 85 Pac. (2d) 790 (1938), one 
of the issues was whether the 60 shares of stock 
in the Summit Creek Irrigation Company being ex-
changed for a continuous flow of water, plus other 
considerations, was an exchange of water rights of 
equal use value so as not to be violative of the con-
stitutional prohibition contained in Article XI, Sec-
tion 6 of the Utah Constitution. In sustaining the 
trial court's finding that such exchange was of equal 
use value, this Court noted that a certificate of stock 
in a mutual irrigation company is actually a water 
right in the sense that it entitles the holder to an 
aliquot share of the waters of the company according 
to the method of distribution. Any inference by ap-
pellant that it carries with it the right to a particular 
source of water is wholly unwarranted. 
The case of St. George City v. Kirkland, et al, 
17 Utah (2d) 292, 409 Pac. (2d) 970 ( 1966) does 
nothing more than re-affirm the above and is of no 
help to appellant here. Likewise the case of Baird 
v. Upper Canal & Irrigation Company, 70 Utah 57, 
257 Pac. 1060 (1927) is of no help to appellant here. 
In fact, in the Baird case, supra, it was exchange 
water for which she successfully sought to compel 
her connection and the delivery of her aliquot share. 
The most widely accepted definition of a "mu-
tual water corporation" is that stated in Kinney's 
Treatise on the Law Of Irrigation, Volume 3, Chap-
ter 75, Section 1480, Page 2659 as follows: 
"Mutual water corporations may be de-
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fined as those private corporations which are 
organized for the express purpose of furnish-
ing water only to the shareholders thereof, 
and not for profit, or hire." 
\Vhether Alta fits that definition leaves some room 
for doubt since it is being operated for a profit, i.e. 
cash dividends on its stock. Be that as it may, the 
relationship between private incorporated water 
companies, whether organized as mutual corpora-
tions or as a corporation for profit or hire, is that 
of contract; and the rights and duties of both parties 
grow out of the contract implied in a subscription 
for stock and construed by the provisions of their 
charters or Articles of Incorporation. Ibid Kinney's, 
Section 1482, Page 2662. Important here is the fun-
damental proposition stated by Kinney on page 2665 
of his Treatise as follows: 
"But whatever may be the basis of in-
corporation of these mutual companies, in the 
absence of anything to the contrary in the 
Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws, each 
share of stock is ma.de the exact equivalent to 
any other share; and each shareholder in such 
company is entitled to that proportion of the 
water carried through its ditch or canal that 
the amount of his shares or stock bears to the 
whole amount of the shares or stock of the 
corporation." (Emphasis added) 
And so, contrary to the foregoing fundamental 
concepts, appellant urges on page 25 of his Brief 
that his 2 shares of stock have been given a separate 
status, and he urges upon this Court that he is en-
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titled to use his water through a separate system fol' 
a purpose different than the irrigation purposes 
which Deer Creek water will serve just as well. And 
so we ask, why, when his rights are based upon the 
same contract as are other stockholders, and why, 
when his 2 shares of stock are the exact equivalent 
to any other 2 shares, should he be entitled to any 
rights different from or superior to other share-
holders or to enjoy a preferred and superior use of 
water through a separate system? Neither fair play, 
common sense or the fundamental principles of law 
will permit such result. And we submit that appel-
lant has cited no case, no authority nor any legal 
principle to support his contention that he is entitled 
to his share of the corporate water supply from the 
Alta Springs. 
Next appellant asserts that absent his consent 
Alta could not contract away his right to take water 
directly from the Alta Springs which had by common 
consent and practice been given an independent 
status. Yet appellant cites not a single case in sup-
port thereof. We say that appellant's rights as a 
stockholder of Alta are no different than any other 
stockholder, and his 2 shares of stock are the exact 
equivalent of any other 2 shares of stock. And we 
submit that the case of Beggs et al v. Myton Carwl 
& Irrigation Company et al, 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 
984 ( 1919) is controlling here and is clear authority 
for the proposition that the Board of Directors, upon 
confirmation of a vote of the majority of the out-
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standing stock, can enter into binding agreements to 
lease and exchange the waters of the corporation 
and it does not require the unanimous consent of all 
stockholders. The will of the majority controls, and 
so long as there is no discrimination to the rights of 
the minority as stockholders (as distinguished from· 
claimed superior rights as appellant asserts here) the 
action of the majority is binding on the corporation 
~nd all stockholders thereof. The remedy of appel-
lant, as a dissident minority stockholder, is to sell 
his stock, for he, as a hold-out, cannot deprive the 
majority of the shareholders of the benefits of the 
lease and exchange agreements. 
Under the Water Rental and Water Exchange 
Agreements the stockholders of Alta get a guaran-
teed quantity of water in excess of what their share 
from Alta Springs would otherwise be, and they get 
the exchange waters when they want it on call, with 
all of the benefits of storage in Deer Creek Reservoir. 
Thus they don't have to take water when their lands 
are still wet in the spring, nor when it rains, and 
they can hold it in storage for use during the late 
summer months, thereby giving them the diversity 
in the crops which they raise. On top of that, they 
get $10,000.00 per year. And when Orem contracted 
with Alta it contracted for all of Alta's share of the 
Alta Springs based upon its 187 5/6ths shares, which 
includes the 2 shares of stock owned by appellant. 
To adopt appellant's view would be to say that Orem 
did not get what it contracted for, nor what it has 
been paying for since 1956. 
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It is true that the Alta Spring waters as now 
gathered, transported and treated meets public health 
standards for drinking purpose whereas the ex-
change Deer Creek waters as delivered in the Alta 
Ditch do not. But that came about through the ex-
penditure by Orem and Alta of some $32,000.00 in 
covering the Alta Springs ( Exh. 31), to which appel-
lant did not contribute one cent save and except as 
a stockholder of Alta, plus the construction by Orem 
of 4,445 feet of 14 inch pipeline from its headhouse 
to its steel tank reservoir. We say that appellant has 
had a "free ride" for far too many years and should 
not be heard to complain upon its termination. 
Be that as it may, the trial court from its ad-
vantaged position found (Fdg. 14, R. 93) that 
"14. Plaintiff (appellant) was at all 
times aware of the Pipeline and Water Rental 
Agreement and the Water Exchange Agree-
ments involved herein. He consented thereto, 
made no objections thereto and benefited 
therefrom. Even though plaintiff consented 
thereto defendant Alta Ditch And Canal Com-
pany had the legal power to enter into the 
Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and 
Water Exchange Agreements herein without 
the consent of plaintiff. Said Pipeline and 
Water Rental Agreement and Water Ex-
change Agreements are valid and in full force 
and effect and are binding upon the plaintiff.'' 
And there being substantial evidence in the record 
to support the foregoing Finding, it cannot be dis-
turbed on appeal. 
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Likewise the trial court correctly concluded 
( Concl. 6, R. 94) 
"6. That plaintiff (appellant) is not en-
titled to quiet title to any of the waters of Alta 
Springs, is not entitled to divert any water 
directly from Alta Springs and is not entitled 
to injunctive relief as against any of the de-
fendants herein." 
The trial court then entered its judgment dis-
missing with prejudice the Amended Complaint of 
Appellant (R. 94), which we submit was in all re-
spects correct and proper and must be affirmed 
herein. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
OREM'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR JUDGMENT 
AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE REASON-
ABLE VALUE OF WATER DELIVERED BY 
OREM CITY FROM ITS 14 INCH PIPELINE 
AND USED BY APPELLANT DURING THE 
PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 1, 1962 TO OCTO-
BER 31, 1967. 
In Orem's original Counterclaim filed on No-
vember 18, 1966 Orem City made its claim against 
appellant for the reasonable value of the water re-
ceived by appellant from the Orem City pipeline 
during the period from November 1, 1962 to October 
31, 1966 and for the reasonable value of the water 
received by appellant therefrom if he continued to 
use the same during the pendency of this action ( R. 
31). In Orem's Amended Counterclaim filed on No-
vember 13, 1967 Orem City made its claim against 
appellant current to cover the period November 1, 
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1962 to October 31, 1967 for the sum of $1,834.45 
(R. 67, 68). 
The trial court found against Orem on that part 
of its Counterclaim (Fdg. 17, R. 93) and dismissed 
Orem's claim with prejudice (R. 97). Orem timely 
filed its Cross Appeal from the judgment of the trial 
court in dismissing that part of Orem's Counter-
claim (R. 107, 108). 
The evidence is undisputed that during the pe-
riod from October 5, 1962 to August 1, 1966 the 
quantity of water delivered to appellant by Orem 
City through the appellant's connection was at least 
9,189,200 gallons (Exh. 38, Tr. 259, 272). Likewise 
the evidence is undisputed that during the period 
from August 1, 1966 to October 31, 1967 the quan-
tity of water delivered to appellant by Orem City 
through the appellant's connection was 5,307,000 
gallons ( Exh. 38, Tr. 259). The meter readings from 
which those quantities were determined are in evi-
dence (Exh. 38) and are undisputed and apparently 
are accepted by appellant. During part of the year 
1963 appellant's meter was inoperative and only a 
portion of the water actually passing through his 
pipeline was measured thereby ( Exh. 12 - N overn-
ber 3, 1963, Tr. 213, 279). However, Orem claims 
payment only for the quantities actually metered. 
Likewise the evidence is undisputed that the 
applicable Orem City ordinances fix the rates as the 
reasonable value of the water (Exhs. 35, 36, 37). 
In fact Orem City is the only distributor of domestic 
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[lnd municipal water in that area and of necessity its 
rates fix the reasonable value. Furthermore, Ordi-
nances Nos. 45, 52 and 104 (Exhs. 35, 36, 37) each 
specifically provide that the rates thereby fixed are 
declared to be reasonable and uniform with respect 
to the class or type of service to be performed. The 
rates applied to the water delivered to appellant are 
those uniformly applied to all users of water from 
the Orem City system situated outside of the corpor-
ate boundaries of Orem City. James Twitchell, wit-
ness for Orem City, applied the applicable rates 
fixed by the respective Ordinances to the water de-
livered to appellant and testified that the reasonable 
Yalue thereof (Tr. 273) is 
October 5, 1962 to August 1, 1966, 
9, 189,200 gallons ------------------------------ $1,249.85 
August 1, 1966 to October 31, 1967 
5,3 07, 000 gallons ------------------------------ 614.60 
Total ________ $1,864.45 
Appellant did not attempt by cross examination 
to qualify or discredit the above (Tr. 274), nor did 
he attempt to refute the same on rebuttal. Appel-
lant's only answer was that during the period from 
October 5, 1962 forward plaintiff's claimed entitle-
ment to the Alta Springs would have exceeded the 
above quantities by some 18,000,000 gallons. This 
was supposedly computed by appellant's witness, 
L. V. Beckman (Tr. 277), yet there was no evidence 
that all of such alleged excess went into the Orem 
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system and that such did not take into account the 
fact that the appellant's meter was inoperative in 
1963 (Tr. 278). Nor does it take into account the 
times when Orem City turned the Alta Springs water 
out of its system during run-off and rain storms and 
the like. 
More important is that appellant completely ig-
nores the fact that Orem had contracted for and paid 
Alta for all of such waters in cold, hard cash and 
delivered appellant's share of the Alta Company's 
water into the Alta Ditch. How then can appellant 
be heard to say that Orem City had the use of his 
water and is entitled to a set-off therefor? All other 
stockholders of Alta receive their culinary water 
from the Orem City system and they pay for it at 
the rates fixed by the Ordinance (Tr. 289). And so 
we ask, how can appellant expect to be treated other-
wise? Not only that, but he expects a continuous 
flow delivery of water which has been rendered fit 
for drinking purposes through the efforts and ex-
penditures of Orem and Alta and under pressure so 
he cannot only use the same for domestic purposes 
but to water when he wants to 10 acres of pasture 
and lawns through a pressure sprinkler system and 
not pay one red cent therefor. This in spite of the 
fact that it is in violation of Section 28-3-1, Orem 
City Revised Ordinances ( Exh. 34), which makes it 
unlawful for any user of water from the Orem City 
system to use the water taken therefrom for irriga-
tion purposes. 
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The fact is that appellant has had a "free ride" 
for too many years and he, like anyone else, should 
pay for the water he has received from the Orem 
City system at the same rates as all other users sim-
ilarly situated. Orem has always stood ready and 
willing to deliver water to appellant through his 
connection in accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tion 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953. All Orem 
asks is that appellant pay for the water he uses at 
the same rate as all other users similarly situated. 
We respectfully submit that the evidence is un-
disputed that appellant has had the use and benefit 
of some 14,500,000 gallons of good quality domestic 
water from the Orem City 14 inch pipeline, which 
has an undisputed reasonable value of $1,864.45. 
And the trial court having adjudicated that appel-
lant was not entitled to any of the waters of the 
Alta Springs, there is no basis upon which it could 
find against Orem City on its claim for the reason-
able value of the water delivered to appellant herein. 
Accordingly, the trial court clearly committed error 
mid we respectfully submit that the judgment must 
be reversed in that respect with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Orem City and against appel-
lant in the undisputed sum of $1,864.45. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Findings Of 
Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judgment of the trial 
court must be affirmed insofar as they 
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( 1) dismissed plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint with prejudice 
and adjudicated that 
(2) plaintiff's only right as against de-
fendant Alta Ditch & Canal Company is as the 
owner of 2 shares of stock of said defendant and 
plaintiff has been afforded all rights and privi-
leges thereunder; 
(3) the Pipeline and Water Rental Agree-
ment and Exchange Agreements are valid and 
in full force and effect and are binding on plain-
tiff, and that plaintiff is not entitled to divert 
any water directly from Alta Springs; and 
( 4) plaintiff has no right to use or main-
tain the connection to Orem City's pipeline or 
to convey water through said pipeline or through 
said defendant's other diversion works and fa-
cilities. 
We respectfully submit that Finding Of Fact 
No. 17 and Conclusion Of Law No. 10 respecting 
Orem's Counterclaim for the reasonable value of the 
water delivered by Orem City and used by plaintiff 
herein must be set aside as being contrary to the 
undisputed evidence and in conflict with the Find-
ings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law that plaintiff 
is not entitled to divert any water directly from Alta 
Springs for use on his property herein. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the trial court dismissing Orem 
City's Counterclaim for the reasonable value of the 
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water delivered by Orem City from its 14 inch pipe-
line and used by appellant herein must be reversed 
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Orem 
City and against appellant in the undisputed sum 
of $1,864.45 as the undisputed reasonable value of 
the water delivered by Orem City and used by appel-
lant herein. 
Respectfully submitted 
H. V. WENTZ 
Orem City Attorney 
384 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
JOSEPH NOV AK 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for defendants-
respondents - cross appel-
lants', Metropolitan Water 
District of Orem and Orem 
City 
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